Игры на деньги он on line
Strongly individualistic social theory tries to construct such teams as equilibria in games amongst individual people, but no assumption built into game theory (or, for that matter, mainstream economic theory) forces this perspective (see Guala (2016) for a critical review of options). We can instead suppose that teams are often exogenously welded into being by complex interrelated psychological and institutional processes.
This invites the game theorist to conceive of a mathematical mission that consists not игры на деньги он on line modeling team reasoning, but rather in modeling choice that is conditional on the existence of team dynamics. The intuitive target Stirling has in mind is that of processes by which people derive their actual preferences partly on the basis of the comparative consequences for музыку казино welfare of different possible profiles of preferences that members игры на деньги он on line severally hypothetically reveal.
Let us develop the intuitive idea of preference conditionalization in more detail.
People may often-perhaps typically-defer full resolution of their preferences until they get more information about the preferences of others who are their current or potential team-mates. Stirling himself provides a simple (arguably игры на деньги он on line simple) example from Keeney and Raiffa (1976), скрипт i игр на деньги игры на деньги он on line a farmer forms a clear preference among different climate conditions for a land purchase only after, and partly in light of, learning the preferences of his wife.
This little thought experiment is plausible, but not ideal as an illustration because it is easily conflated with vague notions we might entertain about fusion of agency игры на деньги он on line the ideal of marriage-and it is important to distinguish the dynamics of preference conditionalization in teams of distinct agents from the simple collapse of individual agency.
So let us construct a better example. Imagine a corporate Chairperson consulting her risk-averse Board about whether they should pursue a dangerous hostile takeover bid. Compare two possible procedures she might use: in process (i) she sends each Board member an individual e-mail about the idea a week prior to the meeting; in process (ii) she springs it on them collectively at the meeting.
In both imagined processes there are, at the point of voting, sets of individual preferences to be aggregated by the vote. But it is игры на деньги он on line likely that some preferences in the set generated by the second process were conditional on preferences of others. A conditional preference as Stirling defines it is a preference that is influenced by information about the preferences of (specified) others. This refers to the extent of controversy or discord to which a set of preferences, including a set of conditional preferences, would generate if equilibrium among them were implemented.
Members or leaders of teams do not игра где убивая зарабатываешь деньги want to maximize concordance by игры на деньги он on line all internal games as Assurance or Hi-lo (though they will always likely want to eliminate PDs). For example, a manager might want to encourage a degree of competition among profit centers in a firm, while wanting the cost centers to identify completely with the team as a whole.
These may регистрация в играх на деньги applied recursively, i. But, as noted earlier, we need to keep conditional preference distinct from agent fusion, and this condition helps to do that.]