Online игры без денег
She obtains her higher payoff, 2, by playing D. We may therefore assign the payoff (2,2) directly to node 2. Now we move to the subgame descending from node 1. Consulting the first numbers in each of these sets, he sees that he gets his higher payoff-2-by playing Online игры без денег. D is, of course, the option of confessing. So Player I confesses, and then Player II also confesses, yielding the same outcome as игры хитман кровавые деньги the strategic-form representation.
What has happened here intuitively is that Player I realizes that online игры без денег he plays C (refuse to confess) at node 1, then Player II will be able to maximize her utility by suckering him and playing D. He therefore defects from the agreement. This will often not be true of other games, however. Онлайн казино на свой сайт noted earlier in this section, sometimes we must represent simultaneous moves within games that are otherwise sequential.
Consider the following tree: The oval drawn around nodes b and c indicates that they lie within a common information set.
This means that at these nodes players cannot infer back up delicious игры мод много денег emily path from whence they came; Player II does not know, in choosing her strategy, whether she is at b or c. But you will recall from earlier in this section that this is just what defines online игры без денег moves as simultaneous.
We can thus see that the method of representing games as trees is entirely general. If no node after the initial node is alone in an information set on its tree, so that the game has only one subgame (itself), then the whole online игры без денег is one of simultaneous play.
If at least one online игры без денег shares its information set with another, while others are alone, the game involves both simultaneous and sequential play, and so is still a game of imperfect information.
Only if all information sets are inhabited by just one node do we have a game of perfect information. Following the general practice in economics, game theorists refer to the solutions of games as equilibria.
In both classical mechanics and in economics, equilibrium concepts are tools for analysis, not predictions of what we expect to observe. However, online игры без денег we noted in Section 2.
For them, a solution to a game must be an outcome that a rational agent would predict using the mechanisms of rational computation alone. The interest of philosophers in game theory is more often motivated by this ambition than is that of the economist or other scientist.
A set of strategies is a NE just in case no player could improve her payoff, given the strategies of all other players in the game, by changing her strategy. Notice how closely this idea is related to the idea of strict dominance: no strategy could be a NE strategy if it is strictly dominated.
Now, online игры без денег all theorists agree that avoidance of strictly dominated strategies is a minimum online игры без денег of economic rationality. A player who knowingly chooses a strictly dominated программа для добавления денег игр directly violates clause (iii) of the definition of economic agency as given in Section 2.
This implies that online игры без денег a game has an outcome that is a unique NE, as in the case of joint confession in the PD, that must be its игры заработок денег без вложений с выводом денег на карту киви solution.
We can specify one class of games in which NE is always not only necessary but sufficient as a solution concept. These are finite perfect-information games that are online игры без денег zero-sum. A zero-sum game (in the case of a game involving just two players) is one in which one player can only be made better off by making the other player worse off. First, there is the problem that in most non-zero-sum games, there is more than one NE, but not all NE look equally plausible as the solutions upon which strategically alert players would hit.
Consider the strategic-form game below (taken from Kreps (1990), p. But if Player I is playing s1 then Player II can do no better online игры без денег t1, and vice-versa; and similarly for the s2-t2 pair. In the case of the game above, both players have every reason to try to converge on the NE in which they are better off.
Consider another example from Kreps (1990), p.]